US and Qatar share of world supply
76% of 2025
two countries
World production
190Mm³, 2025
pre-disruption
Customer allocation, US distribution
50% of normal
since 17 Mar 2026
Last official US price print
$100/Mcf, FY22
series discontinued
China import price, tube trailer
291CNY/m³, Q2 26
+180% y/y
  • Helium supply is concentrated in two countries. The United States and Qatar produced 144 of 190 million cubic metres in 2025, or 76% of world output P. Qatar's entire export volume leaves by sea from a single terminal, in cryogenic containers, through the Strait of Hormuz.
  • The buffer that existed to absorb exactly this is gone. The Federal Helium System held 9.65 Bcf in storage in 2014 P; it was sold to Messer for $460 million on 27 June 2024 P under a disposal mandate written into the Helium Stewardship Act of 2013. The United States now has no strategic helium inventory.
  • There is no exchange, no clearing, and no published spot benchmark for helium. The last official free price print in the market's history was the BLM posted price of $100 per Mcf in FY2022 P, after which the series was discontinued. Buyers are negotiating against a price nobody publishes.
  • The one accessible reference point available today is China's imported tube-trailer price at CNY 291/m³ in Q2 2026, up 180% year on year S, roughly $1,212/Mcf, against a USGS estimate of the 2025 grade-A refined base price of $330/Mcf P. We think that spread, not any single spot quote, is the honest measure of the dislocation.
  • We expect the delivery recovery to lag the production recovery by at least one quarter beyond any Qatari restart, because the binding constraint is the cryogenic container fleet rather than the plants. Liquid helium boils off; a stranded container is not inventory.
01

What was sold, and what it was for

The federal helium program was created in 1925 for military airships and ended, ninety-nine years later, as a line item in a General Services Administration asset sale. The mechanics matter, because they explain why this disruption has no floor under it.

The Helium Privatization Act of 1996 created a $1.37 billion "helium debt" and instructed the Bureau of Land Management to sell crude helium until the debt was repaid. It was repaid at the start of fiscal 2014 P. The Helium Stewardship Act of 2013 then set out a four-phase wind-down: continued sales, then annual auctions with the auctioned share rising by at least fifteen percentage points a year, then federal-use-only once the reserve fell to 3.0 Bcf, then disposal of all assets. At 30 September 2014 the system held 9.65 Bcf, of which 7.82 Bcf was federal P.

The auctions produced something helium has never had before or since: a public clearing price. The first, in July 2014, sold 93 MMcf at an average $161/Mcf P. The fourth, on 20 July 2017, sold 500 MMcf in thirty lots to six buyers at $112 to $128/Mcf, raising $59.7 million P. Then the auctions ended, the posted price series ended after FY2022, and the assets went to market.

The GSA offering was specific: the Cliffside gas plant near Amarillo, the Bush Dome storage reservoir holding roughly four-plus Bcf of federally owned helium and some 60 Bcf of federally owned natural gas, mineral rights over about 38,000 acres, twenty-three wells, and 423.24 miles of federal helium pipeline P running into Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas refineries. Messer was named high bidder in January 2024 and completed on 27 June 2024 at $460 million, transferred to the Treasury that December P.

The part of the sale that did not close

Messer bought the reservoir, the pipeline and the plant. It did not buy the Crude Helium Enrichment Unit, which is owned by Cliffside Refiners L.P., a partnership of Messer, Linde and Air Products. Air Products used its partnership position to block a new lease. On 7 November 2024 a Texas district court placed the partnership into receivership, and on 9 January 2025 the Court of Appeals dismissed Air Products' appeal P. Messer's own filing states that without the enrichment unit the system "would be forced to shut down for several years until a new enrichment unit is built."

We have found no public record of a final resolution. On the public record as it stands, roughly 9% of world helium supply is flowing through an asset operating under a court-appointed receiver because three competitors could not agree a lease. That is a single point of failure sitting inside the system that used to be the market's insurance policy.

02

The shock, and why the containers matter more than the plants

QatarEnergy declared force majeure on 4 March 2026 following strikes on Ras Laffan S. On 19 March the energy minister put the damage at two of fourteen LNG trains and one of two GTL plants, 17% of LNG capacity and 14% of helium output, with a three to five year repair horizon S. On 17 March a major US distributor declared force majeure on helium and capped most customers at approximately 50% of normal monthly volumes, prioritising healthcare, with a surcharge of $13.50 per hundred cubic feet, or $135/Mcf S.

Two policy responses followed, and both are still in force. Russia introduced a temporary helium export authorisation regime on 14 April 2026, running through the end of 2027 S. China banned helium exports outright with immediate effect on 10 July 2026 under MOFCOM and customs Announcement No. 29 of 2026, covering HS 2804290010, with no stated end date S. Two of the four countries that could have supplied incremental molecules chose not to.

The physical constraint is not the plant. It is the box.

Liquid helium is shipped in cryogenic ISO containers with a hold time of roughly forty-five days before the contents are lost to boil-off. When Hormuz closed, production stopped and the fleet stopped simultaneously: filled containers could not sail, and empty containers could not return to be filled. Reporting indicates roughly a third of the world fleet was stranded in Qatar and that repositioning requires a minimum of three months once transit resumes S.

We could not find a published count of the global helium ISO container fleet at any primary source U, and we think that absence is itself the finding. The binding constraint in every helium shortage is a fleet nobody measures. The operational consequence for a buyer is precise and it is the most useful thing in this note: even if Qatar reaches normal rates in October 2026, delivered volumes in Asia and Europe recover a transit-plus-repositioning cycle later. Contract for the lag, not for the restart.

Exhibit 1: Two countries have supplied roughly three-quarters of world helium for a decade
World helium production by country, million cubic metres per year, 2019 to 2025
Mm³/yr0501001502001572019159202016120211592022173202318320241902025United StatesQatarRussiaAll others
Note: 2024 and 2025 figures for Qatar, Russia and Algeria are USGS estimates. Australia is not separately reported after 2023. All figures predate the March 2026 disruption.
Source: USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024, 2025 and 2026, and Minerals Yearbook 2023
03

Where the demand actually is, and where it is quietly leaving

The USGS end-use series is the only free, consistent, government-published demand breakdown in this market, and it contains one genuinely important trend. MRI fell from 17% to 15% of US helium consumption between 2024 and 2025 P, and it is the only major category in retreat.

The cause is not price and it is not substitution at the margin. It is a design change. A conventional superconducting MRI magnet is filled with approximately 1,500 litres of liquid helium; a sealed-magnet system uses 7 litres, permanently P. One vendor reports approximately 2,000 sealed systems installed since 2019 and more than six million litres of liquid helium saved.

On our arithmetic, 2,000 magnets at roughly 1,493 litres avoided each is about 3.0 million litres of first fill removed; at the 1:748 liquid-to-gas expansion ratio that is approximately 2.2 million cubic metres of avoided gaseous demand KR, or a little over 1% of one year of world production, from one vendor's installed base, before counting the recurring boil-off and refill that now never happens. Healthcare procurement should read that as a capital allocation signal rather than a sustainability one: the payback on a sealed magnet is now partly a hedge against an allocation regime.

Exhibit 2: MRI is the only major end use in structural retreat, and the cause is engineering, not price
United States domestic helium consumption by end use, per cent of total
Share of US helium consumption202320242025
Analytical, laboratory, specialty gases212222
Controlled atmospheres, fibre optics, semiconductors171517
Lifting gas161817
Magnetic resonance imaging171715
Aerospace, pressurising and purging979
Welding888
Leak detection555
Diving and breathing mixtures455
Other332
Note: United States domestic consumption only. USGS publishes no world end-use split; do not read this as a global distribution.
Source: USGS, Minerals Yearbook 2023 and Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 and 2026

Against that, the demand story most often told about helium does not survive contact with the sourcing. Helium consumption per wafer start, per fab, or per fab-year is not published at any primary source U. SEMI and WSTS publish equipment and billings data, not gas intensity, and the major industrial gas companies do not disclose per-fab volumes. Every figure in circulation traces to paid market research or to unsourced secondary material. The same is true of helium per kilometre of optical fibre.

What can be said with sourcing is that South Korea, holding roughly 18% of world semiconductor capacity, sourced approximately 64.7% of its helium from Qatar in 2025 S, and that fabs report the exposure as availability rather than cost: helium is a small line in the cost of a wafer and an absolute prerequisite for running the tool. That distinction should govern how a fab contracts. You are not hedging a price; you are buying queue position.

04

Four price proxies, and what each one actually measures

In a market with no benchmark, being precise about measurement is the product. Four series exist that a buyer can use without paying for an assessment, and each measures something different.

The BLM posted price, FY1998 to FY2022. An administered price for crude helium, not a market price, but a continuous twenty-five year series that ran from $47.00 to $100.00 per Mcf P. It is dead, and its death is the reason the other three matter.

USGS estimated grade-A refined base price. $390/Mcf for 2023 and 2024, $330/Mcf for 2025, with USGS explicit that producers post surcharges on top P. Annual, lagging, and a base rather than a transaction price, but government-published and free.

Trade unit values from US Census and USITC DataWeb, HS 2804.29. This is the series we recommend building a procurement panel on. For 2023 it gives US exports at 33.2 Mm³ for $453 million, a unit value of $378.61/Mcf, and imports at 8.0 Mm³ for $91.8 million, or $317.03/Mcf P. It is monthly, by partner country, free with registration, and unlike every other series it will keep updating through the crisis.

Disclosed contract terms. Rare and therefore valuable. A South African producer entering commissioning in 2026 uses $600/Mcf as its average liquid helium price assumption in take-or-pay revenue guidance P. Set against the USGS 2025 base of $330/Mcf, that is an 82% premium and the clearest public marker of post-crisis contracting levels available anywhere.

What we will not print

There is no helium spot market. Figures circulating as "European spot" or "spot above $1,000/Mcf" carry no stated methodology, no sample, and no settlement, and several originate in promotional material for paid trackers. We will report a surcharge, a customs unit value, an administered price or a disclosed contract term. We will not report a spot price for a commodity that does not have one.

Position summary

The buffer is gone and is not coming back. Rebuilding a strategic reserve would require both storage and surplus molecules. Neither exists.

Recovery is a delivery problem. Watch container repositioning and monthly customs volumes, not restart announcements.

Substitution is real but slow. Sealed-magnet MRI is permanently removing demand at roughly one per cent of world output per vendor cohort.

Measurement is the edge. Free, official series exist. The market behaves as though they do not.

Exhibit A: The only official US helium price series ended in 2022 and was never replaced
BLM posted crude helium price, US$ per thousand cubic feet, fiscal years 1998 to 2022
US$/Mcf0306090120FY98FY04FY10FY16FY22
Note: Series terminated. From FY2023 the Bureau of Land Management ceased publishing a conservation price. No official US helium price has been published since.
Source: BLM, FY2022 Posted Price schedule; USGS Minerals Yearbook 2023
Exhibit B: The Cliffside buffer was drawn down 45% in four years, then sold
Helium held in storage at the Cliffside field, year-end, million cubic metres
Mm³0501001502001652019143202013120211222022902023Federal conservation stockPrivate producer stock
Source: USGS, Minerals Yearbook 2023, helium chapter
Exhibit C: Every shortage on record began with one asset failing inside a two-country system
Twenty-first century helium supply disruptions
EpisodeWindowTrigger
1.02005–07US plant outages
2.02012–13BLM system decline
3.02018–20Qatar blockade, maintenance
4.02022–23BLM enrichment unit outage
5.02026–Ras Laffan strikes, Hormuz
Note: Episodes 1.0 to 4.0 as classified by the US International Trade Commission (May 2022) and subsequent trade reporting. Each ran roughly 12 to 24 months and ended only when new supply of the order of 8 to 10 per cent of world output arrived.
Source: USITC, The Impact of Conflict on the Global Helium Shortage, May 2022

How to read our figures

Every material number in this note carries a provenance tag. We do not present sourced data and our own estimates as the same thing.

PConfirmed at a primary source we name
SSecondary reporting of primary data; reporter named
KRKastra Research calculation; method stated
UCirculating but unverified; do not rely on it
Exhibit D: Qatar was running its plants flat out; Russia was running at a third of nameplate
Helium plant nameplate capacity against reported output, 2025
Qatar, three trains
93%
Russia, Amur GPP
30%
World conversion of
nameplate to output
62%
Note: Qatar nameplate of 2.4 Bscf/yr is the sum of Helium 1 (0.7), Helium 2 (1.3) and Helium 3 (0.4) as disclosed by the operators; 2025 output of 63 Mm³ equals 2.22 Bscf. Amur nameplate is 60 Mm³/yr per Gazprom against 18 Mm³ reported. Utilisation ratios are Kastra Research calculations.
Source: QatarEnergy LNG operations disclosures; Air Products, 28 October 2015; Gazprom Amur GPP project disclosure; USGS MCS 2026; Kastra Research

Who this issue is for

Fab and electronics procurement. Contract for the container lag, not the restart date.

Hospital systems and MRI service. Sealed-magnet capex is now partly an allocation hedge; the 1,500 to 7 litre arithmetic belongs in the purchase-order model.

Gas distributors. A surcharge you can source is a surcharge your customer will accept.

Investors. Nameplate is not output. Two of the four largest national producers ran below 95% of it in 2025, and one ran at 30%.

05

Politics and policy

Helium has no exchange, no clearing and no published benchmark, so policy is not one input among many in this market - it is most of the price formation. Three of the four items below are government decisions and the fourth is a court. None of them is a supply-demand event in the ordinary sense.

  1. United States Congress

    The missing buffer is a legislative outcome, not a market failure

    The Helium Privatization Act of 1996 created a $1.37 billion helium debt and instructed BLM to sell crude helium until it was repaid; it was repaid at the start of fiscal 2014 P. The Helium Stewardship Act of 2013 then mandated a four-phase wind-down ending in disposal of all assets, and the system that held 9.65 Bcf in 2014 was sold to Messer for $460 million on 27 June 2024 P.

    Every step was deliberate, statutory, and executed on schedule. The United States now holds no strategic helium inventory at the moment its principal alternative supplier is under force majeure.

    Read. Because the buffer was removed by statute, restoring it requires new legislation that nobody has introduced, and the assets are now privately held, so re-acquisition is a purchase rather than a policy reversal. We see no realistic path to a US strategic helium position within the forecast horizon, and buyers should stop modelling one as a backstop.

  2. Qatar and the Strait of Hormuz

    Three quarters of world output behind two political geographies

    The United States and Qatar produced 144 of 190 million cubic metres in 2025, or 76% of world output P, and Qatar's entire export volume leaves by sea from a single terminal through the Strait of Hormuz. QatarEnergy declared force majeure on 4 March 2026 following strikes on Ras Laffan S, with damage put at 14% of helium output and a three to five year repair horizon S.

    Helium is a by-product of LNG and GTL processing, so its recovery is hostage to the repair schedule of plants built for a different product entirely.

    Read. Helium has no political constituency of its own in Doha. Restart sequencing will be decided on LNG economics, and helium trains will be prioritised only to the extent they ride along. Contract for the LNG repair timetable, not for a helium one.

  3. Russia and China

    Two of four possible incremental suppliers withdrew by policy

    Russia introduced a temporary helium export authorisation regime on 14 April 2026, running through the end of 2027 S. China banned helium exports outright with immediate effect on 10 July 2026 under MOFCOM and customs Announcement No. 29 of 2026, covering HS 2804290010, with no stated end date S.

    Both moves followed the Qatari force majeure rather than preceding it. They are responses to scarcity, which is the configuration in which export controls are least likely to be relaxed early.

    Read. An authorisation regime and an open-ended ban are different instruments and should not be modelled alike: the Russian regime has a stated expiry at end-2027 and is therefore datable, while the Chinese ban has none and will lift, if at all, without warning. Neither is a source of incremental molecules on any timetable a 2027 contract can rely on.

  4. The courts

    The live risk is a competition dispute, not a state actor

    Messer bought the Bush Dome reservoir, the pipeline and the Cliffside plant, but not the Crude Helium Enrichment Unit, which is owned by Cliffside Refiners L.P., a partnership of Messer, Linde and Air Products. Air Products used its partnership position to block a new lease; on 7 November 2024 a Texas district court placed the partnership into receivership, and on 9 January 2025 the Court of Appeals dismissed Air Products' appeal P. We have found no public record of a final resolution U.

    Messer's own filing states that without the enrichment unit the system would be forced to shut down for several years until a new unit is built.

    Read. Roughly 9% of world helium supply is flowing through an asset under a court-appointed receiver because three competitors could not agree a lease. This is the highest-consequence unresolved item in the note and it will be settled by a docket rather than by a ministry, which means it can resolve in either direction without notice.

06

Key debates

  1. Does Qatar's restart end the shortage?

    The bull case is straightforward: the operator has targeted normal operations for October 2026 ex the damaged trains, tankers have been massing at Ras Laffan, and gas forecasters see rebalancing in the fourth quarter.

    Our answer. Partially, and later than the headline. Two of fourteen trains carry a three to five year repair horizon on the operator's own statement, which removes a durable slice of helium capacity. The restart also does not reposition containers. We would expect delivered volumes in Asia and Europe to normalise a quarter behind Qatari production, and the Amarillo receivership to remain the larger tail risk.

  2. Is the $600/Mcf contract level the new normal, or the peak?

    It is a single disclosed assumption from a producer with an interest in a high number, set during the tightest market in twenty years.

    Our answer. Treat it as the ceiling of the current contracting round, not a forward curve. But note the direction of the USGS base price, which fell from $390 to $330 between 2024 and 2025, before the shock. The pre-crisis market was loosening. If the historical pattern holds and eight to ten per cent of new supply arrives, the contracts signed in 2026 will look expensive by 2028.

  3. Does semiconductor demand actually tighten this market?

    The narrative is that AI capacity build-out is a structural new source of helium demand.

    Our answer. Unproven and unmeasurable on public data. There is no published helium intensity per wafer or per fab. What is documented is a routing exposure: one major fab economy sourced roughly two-thirds of its helium from a single disrupted origin. The exposure is logistical, not demand-led, and anyone modelling it as demand growth is modelling a number that does not exist.

  4. Was selling the Federal Helium System a mistake?

    The disposal was statutory, the asset was in decline, and $460 million went to the Treasury. The counterfactual is a reserve that would have been drawn down anyway.

    Our answer. The sale is defensible; the absence of any replacement mechanism is not. Cliffside stock fell from 83.1 to 51.8 million cubic metres between 2019 and 2023 and would not have covered this shock alone. But the United States exited storage entirely rather than transitioning to a contracted reserve. One new commercial storage cavern came online at Beaumont, Texas in 2025. That is the whole of the replacement.

07

What would change our mind

08

Watch list

DateEventWhy it matters
Sep 2026First commercial liquid helium delivery, Virginia Gas Project, South Africa, at approximately 70 Mcf/day First genuinely new non-traditional supply source to reach the market during the shortage
Mid-Sep 2026Reported horizon of the QatarEnergy force majeure with at least one European counterparty The single most price-relevant date on the calendar. Extension or lift sets the tone for Q4 contracting
H2 2026North American Helium brings a new Saskatchewan facility online; Renergen Phase 2 construction start Western hemisphere supply additions, both company-guided
Oct 2026QatarEnergy target for normal Ras Laffan operations excluding damaged trains Start of the clock on container repositioning, not the end of the shortage
Q4 2026Container repositioning cycle, three months minimum from any sustained Hormuz reopening Track it in monthly USITC DataWeb imports rather than in announcements
Q4 26 – Q1 27Possible MOFCOM adjustment to China's export ban, which the announcement describes as temporary The fastest available source of incremental supply
~Jan 2027USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2027 First authoritative official measurement of 2026 world production, and therefore of the size of the disruption
OngoingCliffside Refiners receivership Roughly 9% of world supply depends on the outcome
To end-2027Russian export authorisation regime in force Caps the second-largest potential swing supplier
Independent research · Not investment advice · See important disclosures belowData cutoff 24 September 2026

Method and data sourcing

Production, reserve, end-use and price-estimate data are taken from the United States Geological Survey helium chapters in Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024, 2025 and 2026 and Minerals Yearbook 2023. Volumes are stated in million cubic metres per year at USGS convention; conversions to Bcf use 1 Mm³ = 0.0353 Bcf. Liquid to gas conversions use an expansion ratio of 1:748.

Federal Helium System history, storage inventories, posted prices, auction results and asset descriptions are taken from Bureau of Land Management press releases and price schedules, the BLM Report to Congress under Section 19 of the Helium Stewardship Act, General Services Administration sale notices, and Government Accountability Office testimony GAO-15-734T.

Plant nameplate capacities are as disclosed by the operators. Utilisation ratios are Kastra Research calculations dividing reported output by disclosed nameplate and are tagged accordingly. Where a capacity figure is available only from a state agency or trade source rather than the operator, it is not used in a calculation.

Crisis chronology dates are drawn from contemporaneous trade and wire reporting and are attributed in the text. We have deliberately not published a helium spot price, a global container fleet count, a per-fab or per-wafer helium intensity, or a recycling payback figure, because no primary source for any of them exists.

Exhibits numbered 1, 2, 3 run in the body of the note; exhibits lettered A, B, C sit in the margin column. Each series is in the order it is meant to be read.

Notes

  1. 1USGS reports 2024 and 2025 production for Qatar, Russia and Algeria as estimates. Australian production is not separately reported after 2023 and should not be carried forward.
  2. 2The 9% of world supply attributed to the Amarillo system is as characterised in trade reporting of the receivership proceedings, not a figure we have derived from throughput data.
  3. 3Refined price surcharges are additional to the USGS base price estimate and are not captured in it. The distributor surcharge of $13.50 per hundred cubic feet is a published list item, not a transaction price.
  4. 4Sealed-magnet MRI figures are vendor-published for a single manufacturer's installed base and are not an industry total.

Principal sources

USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024, 2025, 2026, helium chapters; USGS, Minerals Yearbook 2023, helium. Bureau of Land Management, FY2022 Posted Price schedule; BLM press releases on the Federal Helium System sale and auctions; BLM, Report to Congress on Items Required by Section 19 of the Helium Stewardship Act. General Services Administration, Sale of Federal Helium System Assets, 22 June 2023. GAO-15-734T, 8 July 2015. US International Trade Commission, The Impact of Conflict on the Global Helium Shortage, May 2022, and DataWeb trade statistics, HS 2804.29. QatarEnergy LNG, Ras Laffan Helium operations disclosures; Air Products press release, 28 October 2015. Gazprom, Amur Gas Processing Plant project disclosure. Messer press releases, 27 June 2024 and 13 January 2025. ASP Isotopes, 20 August 2026. Philips BlueSeal product disclosures. MOFCOM and GACC Announcement No. 29 of 2026. Contemporaneous reporting from Reuters, Bloomberg, CNBC, NPR, Caixin, Chemical & Engineering News and Arabian Gulf Business Insight, attributed in text.

Abbreviations

Important disclosures

About this publication. Kastra Research is an independent research publisher. We are not a broker-dealer, investment adviser, or registered investment research firm. We do not underwrite, trade, or make markets in any security or commodity, we publish no ratings or price targets on securities, and we make no recommendation to buy, hold, or sell any security.

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No reliance. Information in this report is drawn from sources we believe to be reliable, but we make no representation or warranty, express or implied, as to its accuracy, completeness, or timeliness, and none should be inferred. The provenance tags exist precisely because reliability is not uniform across the figures we print. Nothing here is a substitute for a recipient's own verification, and no recipient should act on any figure, estimate, or conclusion in this report without independently confirming it against the underlying source, which we name so that they can.

Forward-looking statements. This report contains estimates and scenario analysis. Forecasts depend on the assumptions stated alongside them and actual outcomes will differ, potentially materially. Historical relationships are not a reliable indicator of future results.

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Use of artificial intelligence. This report was produced with the assistance of artificial intelligence. AI tools were used in gathering and summarising source material, in drafting and editing the text, and in preparing the exhibits and the calculations behind them. AI systems misattribute sources, transpose figures, and state false things fluently, so the provenance discipline in this note is the control on that failure mode rather than a presentational device: every figure carrying a P or S tag was checked by the author against the named source, and figures the author could not confirm are tagged U or listed under "What we could not verify" rather than presented as established. The judgements, the conviction levels, and any errors are the author's. The use of AI does not qualify the analyst certification above and does not reduce the author's responsibility for anything in this document.

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Kastra Research Document HE-2026-01 · v1.0 · Data cutoff 24 September 2026